Choreographing Otherness:
Ethnochoreology and Peacekeeping Research

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Ethno-choreology – the study of dance as ethnic and cultural practice – has been applied to a highly volatile and politically complex setting: The Israeli – Palestinian conflict. In an ethnographic study of Israeli-Palestinian Joint Security Patrols from 1997-2000 the choreography of multiple masculinities¹ and the management of emotions have been made accessible because social anthropological theory has integrated with dance-based and Laban² influenced thinking tools. Noting the arrangement and access of expressive bodies moving and interacting through space facilitates an analysis of identities, symbols and politics but also subverts the very analytic tools used by security thinkers and political scientists.

I frame the study of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation within the feminist dilemma where thinking itself becomes a gendered project. Carol Cohn³ describes the struggle and marginalization of women who bring non-hegemonic ways of thinking and talking about war and peace. When I write about the management of emotions, choreographing bodies and the negotiation of multiple hegemonic masculinities

²Rudolf Laban (1879-1958) - father of German Expressionist dance – was a philosopher of movement who developed a system to describe harmonious patterns of movement to spatial pulls and tensions in space (Choreetics), a comprehensive language of movement notation known as Labanotation and a descriptive terminology for movement quality (Laban Movement Analysis). His systems are central to the art of theatre and dance in England and the U.S today.
military men's eyes glaze. My talk would not only weaken or make feminine men in the war room but be blatantly disregarded as irrelevant to the war and/or peace project.

One may not expect the same experience of marginalization in the arts – but alas, dance is indeed the most marginalized art within performance and culture studies for it lacks civilization's pearl – the written word. It also lacks permanence - the capacity – as in painting, sculpture, or music – to maintain itself as an enduring reminder of abstract human constructions. Dance tends to be used as a metaphor for the frivolous, feminine and fleeting. At best, the body may possess narratives, as metaphors for Austin's speech acts – or practices that reproduce Butler's performativity of gender. But the expressive moving body remains elusive and generally outside mainstream theory except among dance scholars.

Drawing from and inspired by Susan Foster's⁴ distinction between choreography and performance, I use the term choreography to call attention to the thinking body in action - to help refine our understanding that the expressive body provokes thought. And that thought guides, directs, instructs and informs expressive movement. Choreographies suggest the embodied totality of the intuiting, sensing, feeling and thinking aspects of the self and subverts the categories of mind vs. body; thinking vs. emotion.

Choreography, in contrast to performance, problemizes the body as the self in motion as a thought out and designed repertoire of movement. Not necessarily

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spontaneous, nor "naturalized" as Bourdieu's habitus\(^5\) – the well embodied set of dispositions, which reproduce identity and one's position within relations of power. The term choreography elaborates upon Butler's \(^6\) principle of performativity - "the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being"

In contrast, choreographies enable both the dancers and the choreographers to create phrasing – to adjust timing – to attune focus – to alter how I, as mover, must move now in an action to maintain my anticipation of another body moving towards me and whether I must interact. Choreographic rules, principles and guidelines may specify the form and the meaning of movement but they also potentialize and support improvisation, creativity and a mutually adaptive process between bodies moving through space that can change and alter meaning. It is a way to discuss and develop the idea of parole in motion.

Most importantly, I use the term choreography in order to frame a discussion about process – for this is the special privilege in seeing from a dancer's perspective. I am not looking at the dance – but at dancing. I am looking at change – at a political and historical moment of transition and at the project of transforming fighters into peacekeepers within the transitional space\(^7\), i.e., transitional political territory, that conditioned, framed and determined the allocation of resources and defined relations

of power. Transition is recognized as both a temporal and spatial process where improvised practices both reaffirmed and stretched the rules of the game.

I found that to negotiate hegemony between Israeli and Palestinian masculinities, to “name men as men”\(^8\) military men challenged the constitutive acts that defined their manliness - acts that served as external expressions of internal frames of meaning. Furthermore, mental brackets that most supported and endangered the project of security cooperation teetered on the mind/emotion divide. I refer to the moral sentiment defined as honor. I found that to work with honor as a moral sentiment and refrain from discussing the very different ways in which Israelis and Palestinians talked about emotion seems intellectually dishonest. And to mention choreographing otherness risks sounding naïve in a setting of military security advisors. Nevertheless, the following discussion is an attempt to rework what constitutes the practice of security and hopefully shed light on how to successfully transition from war to peace.

The paper begins by describing the “Theatre” followed by a discussion that problemizes the working man. Two aspects of the “choreographed” process – the culture of the gun and the handshake – explicates the central theme that the negotiation of moral sentiments is an embodied process that constituted the primary work effort of Israeli and Palestinian military men during the Oslo period of military security cooperation. In other words, fighters-turned-peacekeepers negotiated their expressive movement not simply in order to perform their work – but more

importantly, I am arguing that the instrumental practice of peacebuilding itself was to achieve the embodiment of change.

**The Theatre**

The “theatrical performance” of security cooperation existed within two distinct domains – one at the macro-level and one at the micro-level. At the macro-level an asymmetric relationship was arranged in a “field” delimited by the control of bodies moving through space. The field, in Pierre Bourdieu’s\(^9\) sense of the term, was defined by the struggle over resources and the realignment of symmetry. Since the 1990s temporary borders, as transitional territorial sites, have been a familiar political arrangement that defined Israeli-Palestinian relations. Created by the Oslo Agreements (1994, 1995) and implemented by legal contract and a complex military infrastructure as the modus operandi for the Interim Agreements\(^10\) they established a unique landscape on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The Oslo Agreements divided the land into enclaves defined by the degree of civil and security autonomy accorded to the Palestinian Authority. Thus, territories were ascribed a different letter – A, B, C or H - and civil and security autonomy granted to the largest Palestinian cities (Areas A), eight in the West Bank and two in the Gaza Strip. Smaller villages (Areas B) were enabled civil autonomy but remained subject to Israeli security operations. Area C comprised the majority of the land mass.

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\(^{10}\) The Oslo Agreements established a civil-military arrangement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from May 1994 – October 2000. The violence that began September 28 October 2000 The onset of the Al Aksa Intifada marked the demise of the Oslo Agreements and the gradual re-occupation of the West Bank and later the Gaza Strip by the IDF. All autonomous security rights were null and void as Israel destroyed the Palestinian’s security infrastructure constructed by Yasser Arafat.
primarily unpopulated or if so, by Israeli settlers, and consisting of all the major thoroughfares between one Area A or B and another. Area H refers to the area of Hebron.

An unprecedented security arrangement also took place. The establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian military security forces created sterile pockets of “as-if” equivalence between Israeli and Palestinian security forces in enclosed spaces called District Coordination Offices (DCO). Military security cooperation manifested as a unique social experiment of “non-mediated peacekeeping”. It consisted of Israeli and Palestinian security forces – of equal or equivalent rank - who worked within the same compound 24-hours a day to manage conflicts, resolve banal problems of daily life, orchestrate conflict-resolution sessions and mobilize and supervise Israeli-Palestinian Joint Patrols (JP), which worked together like Siamese twins.

Their coordinated security efforts took place as other Israeli security forces continued to operate in areas B and C - conducting house searches and other “general security” operations including permanent and temporary checkpoints. In other words, the “transitional space” - as established by the Oslo Agreements - created a security arena where both occupation and equivalence occurred simultaneously. Both existed within a temporal framework and political understanding – as outlined by the agreement – that by May 4, 1999 the interim period would be drawn to a close. There was a beginning – middle – and end point that the social actors performing

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11 Non-Mediated Peacekeeping is presented as an additional option to UN, NATO or other intervening third-party peacekeeping forces. For an introduction to the term, see Heifetz-Yahav, 2004, “Non-Mediated Peacekeeping: The Case of Israeli-Palestinian Security Cooperation,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 15(2):77-130.
security cooperation assumed would transpire. However what was written on paper and what occurred in the field were two different worlds.

It was very clear that at the macro-level Israelis controlled Palestinian bodies moving through the territorial space of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Indeed, the definition of power was body-based in terms of the control of movement, access to bodies vis-à-vis road blocks, checkpoints, house searches and other activities under the general rubric of security and security practices. However, practices of “security cooperation” also suggested a future time where trust and equivalence formed an idealized web of relations. Within the DCOs or on the Joint Patrols, relations of power extended beyond definitions of who controlled bodies moving through space. Instead, analytic focus mobilized towards the control and direction of the embodiment of change - of movement quality and expression itself, i.e., of the dance.

**The Dance – A Choreographed Relationship**

In their micro-level relations PLO and Israeli Defense Forces “fighters-turned-peacekeepers” performed daily ritualized practices to re-arrange and reproduce control within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On their Joint Patrols, relations were publicly performed in full view of Israeli and Palestinian audiences as they traversed routes through Palestinian villages and open spaces. The Oslo Agreements clearly outlined which jeep would lead and which would follow through Areas A, B and C re-affirming national sovereignty and legitimacy yet maintaining the transitional status. Highly charged conflicts could and did arise if one jeep led the other through the inappropriate space although flags and other paraphernalia signified
the jeeps as “peace patrols.” At rest stops, the men may shake hands, drink coffee or tea, eat, laugh, tell jokes or remain sequestered in their jeeps. They may also throw verbal or non-verbal insults that challenged codes of honor or shame. Some inadvertently intended to create relations of solidarity but were interpreted by the other side to be disrespectful or humiliating. Thus, a wide, arc-like back slap may signify camaraderie among Israeli officers whereas light multiple kisses reproduced respect and power among Palestinian officers. Numerous moments and gestures could turn the relations into violent confrontation whether inadvertently or by intent.

To prevent or reduce violence the newly created social structure was rehearsed and re-rehearsed. Daily briefings occurred separately and occasionally as a joint event where Israeli and Palestinian commanders stood before their soldiers and outlined the days’ protocol. Pre-mission briefings prepared soldiers with guidance of proper movements, handshakes, gun protocol and techniques to avoid direct confrontation. Two protocols mentioned during these briefings will be discussed below – the “culture of the gun” and the handshake. The instrumental goals of security cooperation, or “non-mediated peacekeeping”, were bound to movement, bodies and space. It will be seen that the men struggled to embody movement qualities that defined gendered ideals and created the domain where masculinities were tested.

**Culture of the Gun**

The culture of the gun refers to the specific protocol associated with the physical manipulation and use of the soldiers’ M16 (Israelis) or Kalashnikov (Palestinians) rifles. It reflected the tension of divergent body practices where a progressive change occurred. Indeed, the process of ‘acquiring the moves’ constituted a singular
factor where Israeli and Palestinian military etiquettes collided. Palestinians and Israelis handled their guns differently.

In the Israeli case, the stages of managing a gun were precise and well defined. Strict discipline subject to penalty and jail applied to all Israeli military men who were rigorously drilled. Soldiers underwent a Foucaultian process of discipline and punishment. Israel army rules controlled and strictly limited the possibility of deviation from norms of military practice. For practical purposes, normative values established safety and security to limit unneeded injury or death. Israeli soldiers talked about the disciplined practice of *Tarbut haNeshik* - “culture of the gun” – as a crucial aspect of their military professionalism that they measured against their Palestinian counterparts.

The strict routine constituted a set of six operating procedures that controlled the handling of a gun. First, police soldiers were instructed how to hold and carry the gun when not in use, since their guns were required at all times when on duty. Israeli protocol required that guns be strapped over the shoulder across the chest and pointed down and back. When seated in his jeep, the police soldier should place the gun on his lap, pointing back, but his hands poised and resting on the gun ready to use if needed. In the event that the gun must be taken in hand when lethally threatened, first, the soldiers tries to stop the dangerous person verbally. Second, he should ready the cartridge if verbal warnings prove ineffective. Third, he must then cock his rifle. Fourth, he must remove the safety pin from the trigger. Fifth, only then, is the soldier permitted to shoot to stop – but not to kill. Sixth, only if someone points a loaded gun to kill is the soldier then required to shoot to kill. Israelis must master the moves and
those who fail can be sent to military prison for the slightest infringement of gun etiquette.

The Israeli army’s “culture of the gun” became a source of particularly intense conflict when Border Patrol “fighters” confronted Palestinian police soldiers who possessed an entirely different “culture.” Israeli policemen described how Palestinian policemen frequently pointed a loaded gun when angry. From my first interviews in 1997 until my last in 2000 Israeli policemen complained that Palestinian policemen frequently pointed a loaded gun during arguments at the Rest Stop. Consequently, Israelis were forced to re-learn a culturally valued and embodied discipline. When asked about their need to adapt, they reacted with disdain. For the Israelis on the Joint Patrols, Palestinian police soldiers were not perceived as professional, reliable, serious or well disciplined. They were framed as dangerous and untrustworthy. Proof to their claim why, as professionals, “Palestinians can’t be trusted” (Assaf, Israeli JP Jeep Commander, Hebron) was attributed to Palestinian’s apparent lack of a gun culture. The resulting tensions surrounding the gun as a body practice arose during sessions of conflict resolution.

Rami (Israeli DCO Officer, Kalkilieh)
Q: What do you mean that they learn from you?
A: They act like us – they watch us. It’s not that they talk about it. But when I first got to Kalkilieh they would walk with their guns loaded and pointing straight ahead. That’s not to say that they don’t also fire their guns in the air during weddings, they do. In fact, yesterday on the base, two shots were fired accidentally. Now for us, it’s important that we insure that an incoming Israeli doesn’t interpret that he is being fired at intentionally and begins shooting and creating an escalation of violence. There is a real danger from accidents of this sort. But with time, they Palestinians also began to sling their guns over their shoulders. When I go into a meeting and say, let’s discuss four-points, they also say let’s discuss four-points. When I say let’s cut the meeting short – they also say let’s cut the meeting short. The Palestinians act like us but don’t want to talk about it.
Over time and numerous moments of contact, Israeli patrolmen learned to re-interpret the move and “not get too excited” (Rami, Israeli JP Jeep Commander, Kalkilieh). Thus, when a Palestinian policeman on the Joint Patrol pointed a loaded gun it was seen as a threat gesture, a signal of warning – not a move to express intent to kill but to signify the potential power to kill. The way Palestinians managed their guns essentially forced Israelis to unlearn what had become the natural and right way to handle machine guns. In the spirit of Bourdieu’s concept of body hexis, the Israelis had made natural a specific set of body practices that had been both socially constructed and reinforced. Thus, the disrespect towards Palestinians who “lacked” a gun culture in the Israeli sense, created a hierarchy of distinctions and this is reflected in the deprecating attitude revealed in numerous Israeli narratives.

Direct contact formed a site that contested professionals and professionalism. Palestinian commanders acknowledged the need to develop themselves as professionals. Copycat techniques of practice reflected the process of adaptation and accommodation to distinct modes of professional behavior. The changes and influences of the daily work through contact and cooperation enabled one Palestinian officer to affirm solidarity at the DCO through “the shared language of military men” (Nadim, Palestinian DCO, Tulkarem).

When I tried repeatedly with Palestinian officers to discuss specifics about a Palestinian “culture of the gun”, my attempts yielded minimum reference to details. Only in September 2000 I succeeded to ascertain aspects of their ‘gun culture’, outlined below by Ali (Palestinian DCO Officer, Ramallah) as four steps:
1. Verbally warn the person
2. Shoot in the air
3. Shoot in the legs
4. If no other solution, shoot to kill.

The critical steps of when the bullet moves in place, i.e., when it is cocked, and the safety pin released did not appear in their protocol as outlined to me. In general, I was struck by the difficulty I found in formulating a coherent Palestinian military protocol for gun use. Furthermore, when I tried to explain the purpose of my questioning, the Palestinian officers consistently became defensive and raised examples to prove that the Israelis do not have a “culture of the gun” since Israeli policemen or soldiers have shot and killed innocent Palestinian citizens.

Over the years of my research, Israelis complained less about Palestinian soldiers and policemen wearing the rifle strap over one shoulder. Rather, like Israelis, Palestinian soldiers wore their rifles strapped over their chest and their weapons pointed down and back. At least for the Israelis, their shared movement vocabulary and newly acquired body techniques\(^{12}\) reduced uncertainty and increased professional trust. The “culture of guns” proves a primary example of the embodiment of change through a newly acquired movement repertoire that resulted from an adaptive process after five years (1995-2000) of profoundly complex and ambivalent daily interaction.

**The Handshake**

Whether the patrols rendezvoused at the DCO or at the Rest Stop, crucial elements comprised the initial encounter, which impacted upon the well functioning of the Joint Patrols. The joint work began only once the men engaged in rites of

acknowledgement. Each man would shake hands and exchange words of greeting to the other. First the officers shook hands. Then the Palestinian officer shook the hands of the Israeli policemen while simultaneously, the Israeli officer shook the hands of the Palestinian policemen.

If at any point, a policeman refused to shake hands with someone from the other team, particularly the officer, it would be taken as a grave insult. In many such circumstances, the joint patrol was cancelled on the spot. Thus, proper greetings and appropriate touching constituted critical moments before the jeeps went on patrol. The senior Israeli commander of the Border Patrol described a story to illustrate the crucial importance of proper touching and its value as a custom.

Amin (Israeli Border Police Commander, Kalkiliyeh)
When I shake hands I express that you exist, and that I value your existence enough to be willing to engage in a working or even friendly set of relations. So before patrol duty begins, everyone stands and shakes hands, saying good morning to each other. Once, there was a policeman who turned away when the Palestinian officer came and extended his hand to shake. I received a report about it from the Palestinian DCO and immediately called in the policeman. I explained to him the significance of the handshake, that it is all in order to build trust between the states. I explained that it is the custom that is very acceptable, on both sides, and that this is the way we begin each patrol before we go out on duty. By refusing the handshake it would be seen very badly. It would be a great insult.

Touching was not only to be felt, but also seen. Onlookers who witnessed the mutual affirmation attested its essential value. But the depth of gesture’s meaning bypassed most Israeli policemen who required explicit directives by their commanding officers. The Israeli Border Police commander in Gaza described that the handshake was required of all his men. The gesture created an instrumental baseline for contact. To grasp hands in mutual acknowledgement became both problematic and essential particularly during excessive political and social tension.
Ariel (Israeli Border Police Commander, Gaza)

I insist that all soldiers with the Border Police shake hands with the Palestinians – not only that the commanders shake hands. Now there is a problem with consistency, especially when there is a terrorist attack or with Netanyahu’s policies, his refusal to abide by the Wye Agreement or after we return from a Palestinian demonstration. But there is no substitution to the meeting. And we insist, we demand that there be an appropriate meeting. The entire patrol will be soured if not cancelled for the rest of the day without the initial handshake. The patrol requires a shared connection.

The political forces that threatened to undermine cooperative work were kept at bay by the handshake. Consequently, it represented a critical moment of mutual acknowledgment, essential in building a “shared connection.” Indeed, the exchange of hands constituted proper greeting behavior and formalized the willingness of the Joint Patrolmen to work together despite macro-level tensions. Furthermore, handshakes could be classified. They represented depth and quality of friendship, trust and respect.

Israelis soldiers expressing warmth and solidarity assumed a sweeping, wide, prolonged action with a loud strong grasp. Between Palestinians, particularly men with stature and authority, meaning moved from hand to mouth. Touch through the handshake was substituted for a kiss, given out of deference, respect and warmth. The more kisses, the more intense the expression of deferential qualities and attitudes. Indeed, greeting behaviors appeared to possess different shades of “‘body-reflexive practices’…(where) bodies are both objects and agents of practice and the practice itself forming the structures within which the bodies are appropriated and defined”\(^\text{13}\).

I witnessed bodies engaged in emotional displays that both validated social standards of social structure and reinforced a certain mood - the performance simultaneously reproduced and constructed an emotional climate\textsuperscript{14}. Indeed, one Palestinian DCO Officer defined the underlying purpose of the “peace patrol” to reproduce that “we both affirm that there is an Israeli people and there is a Palestinian people.” (Palestinian DCO Officer, Tulkarem). Subsequently, only once the gesture of good-will was established, and each side recognized the legitimacy of the other could the foundation from which the next set of commands be built. Through the specific body practice of handshaking one side acknowledged the other side’s intrinsic value. However the reverse was not the case.

Israeli officers placed minimal if any meaning on the importance of the handshake. They were willing to work regardless of warm gestures or mutual acknowledgement. Consequently, the handshake possessed asymmetric significance. The equivalence sought by the Palestinian side would reveal itself in numerous contexts and through various mediums. Furthermore, the implicit danger in mutual acknowledgement was also bound to the appropriation of the “Other’s” movement repertoire and would become another zone to negotiate relations of power. As a form of instrumental practice, the handshake once successfully exchanged, opened the gate for each group to receive instructions by their respective DCO commanders regarding where and when to begin the patrol. Only then did they enter their respective jeeps and begin the Joint Patrol.

Discussion: Crossing Boundaries of Embodiment

I have argued that embodiment involves bringing into the body a set of culturally legitimated and skilled moves that served political purposes. The Israelis sought the professional model of the military man and the Palestinians reproduced the native model of Palestinian patriarchy, inseparable from their national struggle. Their non-verbal agendas identified a plurality of masculinities that were watched and evaluated; vulnerable to loss and held up to repeated tests. As such, their multiple masculinities – the variable practices that constitute masculinity – were culture specific, historically contextualized and vulnerable to loss.

One’s masculinity remains under threat of failing to pass the test – particularly in a context of political transition, military security cooperation and trust building. I found that the multiple masculinities were bound to a discourse of power that required skill. In other words, the men working on the JP and in the DCO were not trying to control the meaning of masculinity. Rather, they were negotiating the validity of one and the other’s manhoods to co-exist. Being good at being a man may not only reside in professional skill15 but also along the fine line between control and loss of control involved in the skill to maintain proper poise, particularly affirmations of Palestinian identity. Both sides looked for the other to adapt to each other’s way of performing. Additionally, Palestinian officers did not speak of emotion and emotion work as

irrelevant to peacebuilding. Rather, I heard the comment that “Israelis think without feeling.”

Furthermore, very typically, in the Palestinian officer’s ‘public’ narratives, the general trajectory of embodiment moved in one direction, i.e., towards the Palestinian. In other words, whereas Israelis talked about adapting to Palestinian style or feeling Palestinian pain or even injustice, Palestinians talked about how Israelis must accommodate and change to fit the Palestinian’s behavioral requirements. Israeli professionalism left emotions aside from the discourse whereas Palestinian native patriarchy recognized emotion as the “glue”.

Ariel (Israeli Border Patrol Commander, Gaza)
If the Israeli soldier doesn’t shave, it is as though the soldier hasn’t followed orders. We have strict rules of physical discipline. But the Palestinian behaves without self-discipline. Without his shirt tucked in, without elastic to hold his pants neatly inside his boots (he shows me his elastic). During an “incident” Palestinian soldiers don’t listen to the commanders. During stress, all breaks down. They work according to feelings, to their feelings and not their mind. We always work according to ‘orders.’ During every operation into the field there is a briefing that is comprehensive. This includes how to behave both in general and in the event of an operation. We discuss how to examine people, what is permitted and forbidden to do with citizens, when it is permitted to use gas and rubber bullets or gun fire. But this information is not given to the Palestinian soldiers. They are told to get in the jeep and go.

The Israeli narrative constitutes Palestinian professionalism as a lesser kind because Palestinians act according to “their feelings and not their mind.” As such, the very logic of emotions, which recognizes that Palestinian willingness to engage in a relationship was dependent upon the professional willingness of Israelis to adapt. Israelis actors were torn by mask-wearing contradictions yet their professional ethic

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kept them in the game. And while the senior commanders, like Khalil acknowledged that his men were learning to follow orders because of military discipline and not the “love towards their commander” (Nadim, Palestinian DCO Officer, Tulkarem), from the Palestinian perspective, their voluntary acceptance to engage in a working relationship was itself representative of their great emotional compromise, accepting a Palestinian state within 1967 borders and relinquishing the struggle for pre-1947 Palestine (Hani, Palestinian DCO, Kalkilieh; Nadim, Palestinian DCO, Tulkarem; Faruq, Palestinian DCO, Ramallah). Therefore the burden to shift their power relations was placed squarely upon the Israelis, who were expected to assume the responsibility of adaptation.

Palestinian officers and policemen may have talked about what they perceived as legitimate emotions of fear and pain arising from Jewish history – “the Jews have suffered for many years” (Nadim, Palestinian DCO Officer, Tulkarem) - but they did not express an expectation that they should behave or feel like Israelis. Indeed, Palestinian commanders or officers acknowledged the pain of Jewish history or expressed sadness when bombs exploded in Israeli cities during the years of my fieldwork. On numerous occasions, Israelis described how Palestinians empathized with Israeli tragedies such as the numerous bus bombings of 1996.

Although Palestinian narratives vary a pattern emerges. Israeli behavior was framed as “occupation behavior” (Hani, Palestinian DCO Officer, Kalkilieh) and thus must accommodate and change into tangible and visible behavioral results. Whether by handshakes, “warm” expressions or the sharing of professional information, Palestinian officers identified that the performance of peace would create the feeling

of peace. As such, Israelis needed to perform their relationship accordingly. Faruq, the Palestinian DCO commander in Ramallah, described that Israelis must learn to behave within Arab standards, i.e., that they must abide by the rules of Palestinian body practices of interaction.

Faruq (Palestinian DCO Commander, C)
Q: What makes it not work? What are the problems? People have told me that there is a problem of culture.
A: (Faruq responds exuberantly in Arabic) People who work with us they should be like us.

Q: They have to know your customs?
A: Yes, yes.

Q: How do they learn your customs?
A: All the problems with the soldiers are discussed when the soldiers meet. This is what we do together during our joint meetings (i.e., the conflict resolution sessions). Their leaders tell all their soldiers not to do that, and that, and that.

Palestinian officers did not talk about needing or wanting to act or think like Israelis. Nor did they talk about Israelis thinking like them. The Palestinian trajectory of influence seemed to reflect back towards themselves, a reversed post-modern mimicry\(^\text{17}\) which in effect, established relations of what may be considered a domain of domination. It was the Israelis who were obligated to embody Palestinianess and not vice versa. Palestinians required this adaptive process from their Israeli counterparts, but the reverse did not equally arise. Israelis did not expect Palestinians to “be like them” as the more legitimate native man, but to “be like them” as professionals who performed according to the universal standards of professional soldiers. For Israelis, the embodiment of Palestinian masculinity subjected them to an

existential threat while forcing them to relinquish their well embodied professional practices.

Israeli soldiers and policemen spoke about the way they must modify and change the very cultural ethos of Israeli military culture. Israeli border policemen not only unlearned how to face a loaded machine gun without firing to kill but also how to show affection and camaraderie according to Palestinian rules of etiquette. I witnessed Israelis intent on expressing warmth and friendship by slapping a Palestinian counterpart on the back, this form of physical contact and friendliness did not tend to occur in reverse. On the contrary, Israelis, particularly Jewish Israelis, adopted the form of multiple cheek kisses as a form of greeting behavior.

Moshe (Israeli JP Jeep Commander, Ramallah)
Q: Could you explain to me honor? How do you manage to giving and receiving of honor?
A: It breaks down to two: There are two patrols. The Israelis work according to routine, and they do not have a problem with honor. We are used to throwing curses here and there between us. It’s part of how we laugh and be together. But for them it hurts their honor. They have a problem with that. And so when we work with the other side, we go through special training for ten weeks before we get to here and we are prepared not to say, ‘what’s happening you manyak (lying idiot).’ First of all, you say ‘what’s happening’ only after you’ve opened up with him. And to say ‘ya manyak’ is forbidden in any circumstance. For them honor is more significant. By the expressions, by the slang that we are used to, the Israeli slang all of a sudden sounds differently. You arrive here and you have to work according to completely different rules.

The variations in what constituted proper masculine expression revealed one aspect of the multiple masculinities functioning between Israelis and Palestinians in security cooperation. Where language, physical contact and body expression reproduced solidarity among Israeli soldiers and policemen, the Palestinians interpreted the same practices as insulting and degrading. And while the burden to
adapt to Palestinian ways of being and acting rested upon the Israelis, these ‘shiftings’ revealed themselves as another domain where the Palestinian team controlled the direction of embodiment. The resulting arena of solidarity-building, when performed well, thus emerged from the tasks of military men. And this was compounded by the shared memories of men of war and the daily difficulties of the work to establish a functioning degree of trust.

Conclusions

I have argued that a process of embodiment as a choreographed process occurred between Israeli and Palestinian military men during the Oslo period. Through the mindful acquisition of the “Other’s” movements a working level of solidarity was established. The process had multiple effects. The capacity to mobilize adaptive change to support changes in the field facilitated the interpretation of bodies as similar and thus capable of trustworthiness. This occurred as both professional and cultural/national practices – as reflections of an ethical or moral way of being in the world as skilled men.

Tests of trustworthiness associated with professional practices or national legitimacy supported the relationship to function despite the persistent forces of asymmetry that determined Israeli-Palestinian macro-level relations. To “name men as men” I have been able to problemize what reproduces men and their masculinity in the daily work tasks of security cooperation. I have drawn from Carrigan’s concept of “multiple masculinities” - the cultural, spatial and temporal diversity of masculinity –
to raise as legitimate a discourse that bonds moral sentiments with security and security cooperation.

Thus, Palestinian honor for the Israeli, not only created security through a relation of well-performed equivalence, but also framed the acquisition and performance of honor and respect as a negotiation strategy. Palestinians enabled Israelis access if they properly performed deference. In other words, power was possessed by the ability to access the goods or resources, which were at stake in the field.

Lastly, the process of adaptive change revealed multiple layers of embodiment suggesting that both Israelis and Palestinians changed over the course of their relationship. Each side acquired new moves possessed by the other side. One questions however, the effect of professional honor versus Palestinian national honor as a potential meeting ground. For although professionalism is a global principle borderless and color blind national honor defines a hierarchy of belonging, and greater legitimacy for one group to exist over another in time and space.
Bibliography


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